Remote Harness GitHub ↗

Security & privacy

Applies to 0.7+

What the daemon can do

The daemon can type into your Claude Code sessions and approve tool calls, so it is effectively a remote shell on your computer. It is locked down by default and nothing in it is reachable from the internet.

Network

  • The app reaches the daemon directly (a WebSocket on every interface of the computer, or only 127.0.0.1 with --dev) or through a connection relay. On both paths every byte is end-to-end encrypted, and a connection that does not complete the handshake with a paired key gets nothing at all; the relay only forwards ciphertext and cannot read your sessions.
  • Claude Code's hooks reach the daemon on 127.0.0.1 only, with a local shared secret kept in a 0600 file; the curl commands the installer writes read it from a 0600 curl config, never from a command line that other processes could list.
  • relay: off or direct: off in the config turns a path off; remote-harness devices revoke <id> unpairs a phone at once.

Keys and pairing

  • Every connection is a Noise protocol session (X25519, ChaCha20-Poly1305) encrypted end to end between the phone and the daemon. The daemon's own keys live in the macOS Keychain, the Linux Secret Service (secret-tool) or a 0600 file; each phone creates its key pair when it pairs and keeps it in its secure storage, on that device only.
  • A pairing code (remote-harness pair, the setup or the tray) works once and only for 5 minutes. The daemon keeps the paired phones' public keys (at most 10) and drops any connection whose key it does not know, before sending anything.
  • Provider keys (OpenRouter) live in the same store, under their own account. They are never written to config.json, settings.json, shell files or the launchers, never logged, and never sent to the phone: the launcher reads the key inside the tmux window, and the daemon only uses it to ask the provider for your credits.

What leaves your machine

  • Push notifications carry a title, the profile and the session id. The live status adds the session name, the folder, the state, the current step (the tool and a short target such as a file's base name or a command's program, never its arguments) and the todo progress. Never the conversation.
  • With the push relay, the relay sees those same content-free messages and a sealed grant (your FCM token); it stores nothing. With your own Firebase project, nothing goes through anyone else.
  • The daemon sends no telemetry. The update check talks to the git remote of the installed source.
  • The OpenRouter catalog and credits requests go from the computer to OpenRouter, nowhere else.

Shell commands

Running commands from the app (Run command…) is off by default and can only be turned on from the computer (remote-harness commands on). When on, a paired phone can run any command as your user in a session's folder, so the app confirms every command first. Each run has a time limit and an output limit, is killed with its whole process group on cancel, and its output goes only to the phone that started it: commands and output are never logged, stored, sent to other phones or put in a push notification.

Permissions

The app never offers the agent's "bypass permissions" mode. "Always allow" writes a rule in Claude Code's own settings, for the project or for your user, and Settings → Permissions → Rules (or remote-harness rules undo) reverts it; deleting a rule written on the computer asks for Face ID or the device passcode. The approval log records which device allowed or denied what, with only the tool and a short target (a file's base name, a command's program), never the input, and keeps 30 days. An unanswered request falls back to the terminal dialog after a few minutes.

Your files

The installer edits settings.json, ~/.zshrc and ~/.bashrc the same way every time: read, merge, back up, write atomically. remote-harness uninstall removes exactly what it added. The plain claude command is never changed.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue. Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories with a description, the impact, steps to reproduce (versions of the OS, Node, Claude Code and the app) and any suggested fix. You can expect an acknowledgement within a few days; once fixed, the advisory is published with credit unless you prefer to stay anonymous. Only the latest release on main receives security fixes. The full policy is in SECURITY.md.